the species landed accounts for three quarters of the variation in prices. For cod in 31 particular, the fish size accounts for nearly all variation in prices. In these fisheries, 32 market conditions justify management focus on the biological composition of the catch. 33 34
Introduction 45
Fishermen operate in a complex decision environment. Harvesting decisions are 46 influenced by expectations of factors such as fish availability, regulations, and market 47 opportunities (Smith, 2012) . Fisheries science primarily considers fishing decisions in 48 the context of how harvests affect fish stock size. Decisions about when to fish, where to 49 fish, what to target, and what gear to use are largely considered in terms of the resulting 50 effects on target stocks, stocks of other species, sub-stocks, or critical habitat. While this 51 emphasis will remain important, it is only a part of the economic environment of 52 fisheries. A separate but important economic dimension of the fishery is how fishing 53 decisions contribute to the economic value of landings. Decisions that influence the 54 catch composition, quality of fish, where fish are landed, and the product forms of 55 landings all contribute critically to fishing revenues and ultimately influence the viability 56 of coastal communities. 57
58
In this paper, we explore this essential aspect of economic value with a unique data set 59 containing detailed daily landings information for all whitefish landed by all vessels in 60 the northernmost management region of Norway. The richness of the dataset allows us 61 to highlight fishing incentives on land that likely affect fishing behavior on the water. 62
These behaviors, in turn, affect fish stocks in ways that inform traditional fisheries 63 management but also point toward ways that fishery managers might contribute to 64 generating economic value from scarce ocean resources. 65 66 When specific product attributes are more valuable than others, fishermen have 67 incentives to target these attributes in the water. However, a systematic targeting of 68 specific attributes can lead to growth overfishing of some size classes (Diekert, 2012; 69 Finnmark accounted for 9.8% of all cod landings in the area covered by the Norwegian 128
Fishermen's Sales Organization, or roughly 7.8% of all Norwegian cod landings. Sales 129 organizations set market rules and a minimum price. We do not explicitly account for 130 the minimum price because it is not perceived to be binding most of the time. Asche et 131
al. (2002) shows that the ex vessel price for cod in Norway is determined by the price on 132 the global market, and Helstad et al. (2005) show that the ex. vessel market for different 133 product forms and sales modes are well integrated. Our results below are also 134 consistent with minimum prices not binding. 135
136
A map with pie areas scaled by total landings shows that landings are not uniformly 137 distributed across communities in the region (Figure 1 ). For each transaction, the data 138 contain transaction date, species, quantity, value, quality grading, vessel length, gear 139 type, and landing spot. If a vessel lands several species at one time, the landing of each 140 species is recorded as a separate transaction. In total, the data set contains information 141 on 579 vessels, 15 communities, 14 companies, and 23 processing plants/landing 142 facilities. Five of these companies have plants in multiple communities. The existence of 143 minimum prices, despite not appearing to bind in most cases, likely discourages 144 oligopsonistic behavior. Moreover, large vessels tend to be mobile and can thus choose 145 to land fish in other regions of Norway. Altogether, the fact that products in our dataset 146 are traded globally in seafood markets that previous studies have found to be highly 147 integrated, and the existence of many sellers (vessels), a reasonably large number of 148 buyers in the region, options to go elsewhere for some of the vessels, and minimum 149 prices to deter anti-competitive behavior, we expect the seafood market in our study to 150 be competitive. 151
152
Cod is the most important species in the data set and constitutes 50.86% of the landings 153 by quantity. This share is substantially larger than in the total Norwegian whitefish 154 fisheries , as saithe and haddock in particular, and to some extent redfish, are also 155 important nationally (Asche, 2009; Foley et al., 2010; Guttormsen and Roll, 2011) . The 156 prominence of cod is due to the fact that the fishing area covered by our data set it in the 157 northernmost county, Finnmark, which is at the northern extremity of saithe 158 populations. As a result, most fishing trips have cod as the main target, with king crab 159 being the only other primary target species. To a large extent, king crab is a separate 160 fishery from whitefish. By comparing percentage round weight to the natural log of total 161 landings for the seven main species in our dataset -cod, haddock, saithe, tusk, ling, wolf 162 fish, and king crab-we see the dominance of cod and king crab (Figure 2 ). For each 163 landing that contains a species, we compute the species share of round weight for that 164 landing and then average these shares across all landings that contain the species. High 165 percentages reflect clean targeting where the primary target makes up most of the catch. 166
Low percentages reflect bycatch, i.e. the species is caught largely as incidental catch. The 167 comparison to the natural log of landings highlights the scale of each species within the 168 multi-species fishery. As a whole, this figure suggests that king crab and cod are cleanly 169 targeted, haddock is targeted to some extent but are also bycatch in the cod fishery, and 170 most other species are not directly targeted. 171
172
Our main focus is cod, but we also provide separate analyses for king crab and for all 173 whitefish species. For each landing location, we have geographical coordinates (latitude 174 and longitude) as well as company name. These data enable us to identify which plants 175 have the same owners using the Norwegian firm ownership register. 176
177
To assess the impact of the different factors on the unit price, we follow the earlier 178 literature (McConnell and Strand, 2000; Carroll, Anderson and Martinez-Garmendia, 179 2001; Asche and Guillen, 2012; Zimmerman and Heino, 2013; Lee, 2014) length are from the model excluding gear type dummies but having otherwise similar 223 structure. In the quality category, there is a small discount associated with head on fish, 224 and a substantial discount at 46% associated with damaged fish. The price seasonality is 225 inversely related to the seasonal pattern in the landings. Relative to January, the 226 premium declines by about one percent in February, March, and April before the 227 premium becomes positive. It is over 5% from June, and peaks at 7.1% in November. Premiums vary little with vessel length. The mid-sized vessels receive a small discount 238 relatively to the smallest, but it is interesting to note that the larger vessels obtain a 239 statistically significant premium of 3.1%. Gear type seems to be more important. With 240 the exception of pots, all gear types fetch a premium relative to gillnet. For most gear 241 types, this premium is limited to less than 2.5%. However, the premium increases to 242 over 8% for bottom trawl and over 20% for long line. Hence, there is no general 243 premium associated with the passive or selective gears utilized by smaller vessels but a 244 premium associated with the two gears that are only used by larger vessels. Taken 245 together, these results suggest that there is not much of a premium for small-sized 246 vessels or particular gear types as attributes (and as some have argued (Armstrong and 247 Sumaila 2001)), but the premiums are a reflection of what is being caught. 248
249
We include different sets of dummies that are associated with the landing sites. In all 250 cases, there is substantial price variation explained by the dummies. There is a 4.1% 251 difference in the average price paid in the highest paying community relative to the 252 lowest paying community. For companies, the difference is 7.29% between the highest 253 and lowest paying company. At the most detailed level, for each plant the premium is 254 8.63% between highest and lowest paying. However, this difference is only 5.4% if the 255 highest paying plant is excluded. When conducting F-tests for whether the price is equal 256 for all plants in each community or for all plants owned by the same company (left panel 257 of Table 1 ), both of these hypotheses are rejected. Hence, it is clear that prices, and 258 thereby fishermen´s revenues, are substantially influenced by the communities and 259 plants to which they deliver their fish. It is also surprising that there seems to be no 260 coordination in pricing between different plants owned by the same company; prices 261 differ statistically across plants within the same company. 262
263
The substantial heterogeneity in premiums for different attributes and strong statistical 264 significance indicate that fishermen have strong incentives with respect to how they 265 fish, what they catch, and where they land the fish. However, it is also of interest to 266 investigate how the variations in the different attributes contribute in percentage terms 267 to the total amount of price variation. To this end, we compute partial effects (η 2 ) and 268 sum them by variable group (Figure 4 ). Fish size is by far the most important category in 269 explaining price variation, as it contributes 94% of the explained variation. This result is 270 an indication that the other premiums are associated with a combination of attributes 271 that are less prevalent in the data and smaller in magnitude. 272
273
We next turn to the king crab fishery. Here there are significantly fewer observations 274 (7, 549) , and the models also explain less of the price variation with an R 2 at around 0.33. 275
Still, the parameters that are comparable over categories are very stable. The estimated 276 premiums are reported in online supplementary appendix Table A2 . Male crabs fetch 277 twice as high a price as females, and there is a substantial discount for damaged crabs. 278
There is a more pronounced seasonality than for cod; there is a 150% premium 279 associated with crabs landed in December relative to January, and generally the price 280 level is higher during fall. The most striking result for crabs is that, although there is 281 significant variation in premium across plants and communities (middle panel of Table  282 1), there are not significantly different premiums across companies. Hence, the 283 companies operate a more consistent pricing policy across plants for crab than for cod. 284
In Figure 4 , we report the contribution of each variable group to the price variation. Also 285 here, the picture is very different from cod, with more characteristics playing an 286 important part in explaining price variation. Seasonality is the most important source of 287 variation (64%), followed by sex of the crab (20%), and quality categories (15%). 288
289
When we include the other whitefish species in a regression together with cod (online 290 supplementary appendix, Table A3), the regressions contain 54,355 observations. In 291 general, the results are similar to those for cod with respect to the common attributes, 292 and there are substantial price differences for the additional attribute species, with cod 293 as the highest priced. The most interesting additional piece of information from this 294 regression is that variation in species is even more important than fish size in explaining 295 price variation (Figure 4) . Hence, what is being caught in terms of species and size are 296 the two most important factors in determining price variation and thereby fishermen 297 revenues. 
